Camus and Sartre as Representatives of Post-World War II European Existentialism
Figure A
Francis Bacon, “Man in a Cap” circa 1945
Europe in the 20th Century was afflicted with many tribulations, foremost among these being the World Wars. With most countries reeling from wartime losses, the global citizenry suffered. In response to this, as is generally the case when faced with such destitute conditions, the population had two basic options: succumb to the privations of their present circumstance, or contend with them using art, philosophy, and community to reckon and survive in spite of them. Notably effective to this end is the European (particularly French) philosophical tradition that sought to encapsulate the mood of the times. This was thought to be a worthwhile exercise because it afforded the coping populace the conceptual tools to understand and address their existential condition. Chief among these attempts to philosophize the despair of post-World War II Europe were the efforts of Albert Camus, who proposed Absurdism in The Myth of Sisyphus, and Jean-Paul Sartre, who developed his brand of Existentialism in Being and Nothingness. To successfully epitomize the European post-war milieu, the philosophies of Camus and Sartre had to account for the context of the period. To that end, both philosophers constructed visions of the sort of person each individual ought to be. For Camus, that individual was the absurd hero, whereas Sartre conceived of the being for-itself. Because Camus and Sartre are thorough in presenting the qualifications of their respective ideas of the person one ought to strive to be, especially as it relates to social and political engagement, the philosophers’ formulations lend themselves to an analysis of whether they effectively represent the spirit of the times. This paper will argue that Sartre’s being for-itself more accurately captures the post-World War II European existential zeitgeist, as seen through intellectual criticism, art, and the socio-political atmosphere of the time, than Camus's absurd hero.
The French Algerian philosopher Albert Camus was heavily influenced by his upbringing in colonial North Africa. The loss of his father in the first World War, as well as his daily interaction with the oppression of native Africans in Colonial Algeria, meant that Camus’s philosophy is necessarily contextualized by first-hand experience with the consequences of European imperialism, a perspective which is notably and apparently scant in intellectualism of the time. Then, Absurdism, and the absurd hero to whom one ought to aspire, functions upon three fundamental axioms. First, Camus argues that human life lacks meaning, especially the sort of meaning argued for by religious and metaphysical theorists. Specifically, he asserts that “themes of irrational and religious thought...have persisted in blocking the royal road of reason and in recovering the direct paths of truth.” Camus views belief in indemonstrable movers and animators of man to be an intellectual defect that disallows one from accessing the truth of their unique condition and the broader condition of the general peer.
Further, Camus’ second axiom is that life is worth living, and by necessity, suicide is an unworthy act. He treats the problem of suicide with solemnity, believing that, “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.” He responds to this problem by arguing that “a man is always a prey to his truths. Once he has admitted them, he cannot free himself from them...A man who has become conscious of the absurd is forever bound to it.” This establishe that the absurd hero, who has necessarily become aware of the absurdity of his condition, will reject suicide because he knows that it will not untether him from that absurdity. Though, the will to live, and requisite rejection of suicide is not a solely physical posture for Camus, but also extends to one’s intellectual life. And, because of his aforementioned rejection of metanarratives for man’s purpose, Camus “call[s] the existential attitude philosophical suicide,” the existential attitude being the umbrella term for the thought of those who, to Camus, engage in mystical thinking. So, it is incumbent on the absurd hero to reject suicide on both physical and philosophical grounds.
The third axiom for Camus is that the absurd hero must find the confinement to absurdity enjoyable. Indeed, Camus declares that, “One must imagine [oneself, the absurd hero,] happy.” Some debate has been had as to whether Camus intended this to mean that it is necessary for the absurd hero to convince themself of the falsehood that the absurd hero is happy so that they are not inclined to commit suicide, or if Camus meant that the absurd hero must actually be joyful about their condition. Quite apparently, Camus favors the latter of these interpretations, writing that “what [the absurd hero] believes to be true must determine his actions.” From this, it is evident that Camus’s absurd hero would not abstain from the action of suicide under the pretense of a false happiness in their condition. Then, the three essential qualities of Absurdism and the absurd hero are a lack of metaphysical meaning, rejection of suicide in the physical or philosophical sense, and happiness in the absurdity of man’s condition.
Conversely, Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism calls, primarily, for two qualities of, what could be called Sartre’s version of the absurd hero, in that it is what his philosophy compels one to aspire to, the being for-itself. Importantly, Sartre’s adolescence, which was, compared to Camus’s, economically comfortable, may have contributed to his philosophy being less revolutionary than Camus’s. Sartre first says that the being for-itself must exist from the will for one so sustain themself, as, “The law of being of the for-itself,” is “the ontological foundation of consciousness.” For Sartre, the being for-itself has to have, and was derived from, a will to create, perpetuate, and transcend itself, since this is the nature of the existence of the being for-itself. Second, Sartre, in a formulation that can be compared to Camus’s concept of philosophical suicide, establishes his notion of bad faith. He writes that “the nihilating power,” of bad faith “nihilates anguish in so far as I flee it and nihilates itself in so far as I am anguish in order to flee it.” Here, Sartre contrived that the being for-itself avoids the denial of their agency because it negates consciousness, which is ontologically opposed to the being for-itself. This consciousness must-as previously established-exist from a self-interested, or possibly an other-interestedconsciousness. Then, the absurd hero and being for-itself are different, primarily, in that the being for-itself has a more instinctually self-interested attitude about its existence but is not required to have a positive disposition about its own metaphysical uselessness that Camus calls for the absurd hero to maintain.
Sartre’s philosophy first triumphed over Camus in the academic sphere, among their fellow philosophers. Many questioned whether Camus’s Absurdism has the philosophical rigor to accurately characterize anything at all. On this, H. Gaston Hall agreed in his criticism of Sisyphus, “Aspects of the Absurd,” indicting Camus’s work for its lack of semantic exactitude, failure to conform with the European philosophical canon, which Hall believes to be the prime philosophical tradition, and misrepresentation of that tradition when he does engage with it. Hall arraigns Camus quite directly for his deficiencies in communicative precision, saying that, “Looseness of language...has led to sophistry, for which Camus has been rightly and harshly criticized.” As Hall observed, the general scholastic consensus on Sisyphus believed that Camus’s writing was aesthetic in the interest of concealing substantive paucity. In the eyes of his colleagues, scarcity in expository depth caused Sisyphus to exist as a vague philosophical penumbra, as opposed to solidly defined, interrogable ideas. Likewise, Hall believed that Camus’s philosophy did not engage with issues that were sufficiently of interest to the European philosophical canon. Hall remarked that Camus, a man who lived in Algiers for much of his life, produced work that was “of minor interest,” because “[the essays] are devoted mainly to North African themes.” It is notable that the criticisms of Sisyphus were not necessarily devastating, or even worthwhile. Understanding Hall’s criticism serves to investigate Camus’s success, or, as it stands, failure, in capturing the mood of the times. It is, then, necessary to note the most broadly held objections to, and dismissals of, Camus’s philosophy, regardless of their efficaciousness—or lack thereof. Relatedly, Hall criticized Sisyphus for its distortion of European philosophers, when it speaks of them at all. He comments that Camus “misrepresents Aristotle in the paradox of the Cretan liar,” as it only “reveals certain limits of language, but nothing about logic or nature,” though Camus interprets it to elucidate something about all such natural and constructed forms. For Hall, this misreading, and Camus’s deficiencies more broadly, are not only problematic in their own right, but also indicate a sort of philosophical incompetence, or laziness, that cripples Sisyphus as to avert the possibility of valuable philosophical insight.
The view that Sartre’s being for-itself is more indicative of the zeitgeist than Camus’s absurd hero is further bolstered by their relative reflection in the art of the time. This can be seen most clearly in the work of Irish painter Francis Bacon. Bacon, who is often considered to be among the foremost existentialist visual artists, was active after the second World War. His work most often dealt with surrealist renditions of themes of loss and existential dread, particularly as they pertained to death and suffering. Bacon’s Man in a Cap (fig. 1) was one such existential work. The painting’s subject is, as the title suggests, a man in a cap. Bacon manipulates the man’s form and background to communicate his intent. Specifically, Bacon contrasts horizontal and vertical lines to create senses of anxiety and discomfort. That is, because horizontal and vertical lines represent rest and uneasiness respectivelyThe combination of the two is acutely disturbing for the viewer. In addition, Bacon obstructs what should be a familiar figure—the man’s face—and portrays what little of it the viewer can see as being in agonizing pain. This characterization of the post-War man is antithetical to Camus's absurd hero. Bacon’s man exists with angst, anxiety, and misery—all of which are qualities that prevent the man from accessing the happiness that Camus requires of his absurd hero. Instead, Bacon’s man is more reminiscent of the being for-itself, in that it fully embraces the anguish of its present circumstance, avoiding bad faith, and still conforms with the Sartre’s ontological mandate for consciousness in his choice to exist in spite of his pain.
Lastly, the ascendancy of Sartre over Camus in characterizing the zeitgeist is apparent in the socio-political mood of the time. To begin, Sartre’s being for-itself is more indicative of post-World War II life in that it was not necessarily revolutionary. Many Europeans, and especially the French, maintained that “Economic change was welcome only if new factors...were fitted into pre-existing frameworks, so that the traditional way of life was only affected slowly.” This conforms to Sartre’s conception well, seeing that the being for-itself, as a condition of itself and other-interestedness, is apprehensive with regard to rapid or ubiquitous change. Conversely, the absurd hero is necessarily revolutionary, and therefore does not correspond to this view of the post-War populace. This revolutionary obligation of the absurd hero further damages its ability to be representative of the mid-1900s body politic because, when they had the option, the French populace chose not to revolutionize. That is, when a candidate who was, at least, more revolutionary than the alternative required public support, “the public was stunned and confused, and it failed to react.” As such, the zeitgeist eludes Camus characterization because it was not revolutionary. Finally, Camus's requirement that the absurd hero be happy disallows the post-War public from being absurd heroes. Meaning, because of tremendous war-time casualties, in both population and land, there was a consistent sense of loss among most of Europe that averted the happiness which was requisite to being the absurd hero.
Though, against the ability of the being for-itself to be indicative of post-war attitudes, it can be argued that Europeans violated Satre’s condition that the being for-itself not engage in bad faith, because of the public amnesia with regard to the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany. This argument is most potent when made about French citizens after the war, who had, what historian Henry Rousso would formalize as, Vichy Syndrome. This, for scholars of post-World War II France, would come to mean the effect whereby histories, most often the atrocious aspects of them, are forgotten by the populace and academics of a given unification, and it is “left to foreign scholars to raise and investigate the hard questions.” The argument, then, is as follows: If Europeans, as most obviously exemplified by the French, did not do as little as acknowledge their history, they were in an inarguable state of bad faith. Meaning, because they did not accept the reality of that which created their condition, they could not be cognizant of the agency they had with regard to that condition, let alone the choice to accept that agency.
While this argument is largely valid, it is not devastating to this paper’s central claim. That is, while the European amnesia with regard to the atrocities of World War II may prove that Sartre’s philosophy does not wholly encapsulate post war attitudes, it certainly cannot be used to conclude that Camus is closer to this goal than Sartre. Then, as previously stated, because the goal of representative philosophy is to give those whom the philosophy seeks to represent a conceptual apparatus with which they can address their condition, this aperture in Sartre’s philosophy has one significant consequence, being: Those post-war European Existentialists who find that they are accurately represented by Sartre must recognize that the journey toward becoming the being for-itself is largely, but not totally, complete. This, for the followers of Sartre, is a call to action, challenging them to become more like that to which they aspire.
So, as can be seen through academia, art, and socio-political attitudes, Sartre’s being for-itself is more indicative of the post-World War II European existential zeitgeist than Albert Camus’s absurd hero. The World Wars were devastating for the world-over. This devastation enhances the degree to which the existentialist tradition born of the conflicts is interesting. While the existentialism of the 20th century produced some of the most worthwhile philosophies in history, it is similarly valuable for what it indicates about the human condition. It bodes well for humanity that, in the face of events as ubiquitously tragic as the World Wars, we have in the past, and therefore can in the future, not only survive catastrophe, but build monumental achievement from it.
More specifically, the philosophies of Camus and Sartre are, themselves, quite pertinent to the modern condition. This is no surprise, as World War II’s impact on the world is indelible. As such, the philosophies erected to contextualize the war remain relevant. Having such a clearly course-defining event provides unique foresight into the world’s sociological, political, economic, and militaristic horizon. Videlicet, the modern individual can see the course on which the World Wars have set the global community, and make proactive decisions about whether they ought to be the absurd hero or being for-itself. Yet, these moments happen quickly. Foresight does not guarantee time to ponder. For example, with rapid social and legislative change taking place in the United States, one must quickly decide whether they want to be the being for-itself-like French, who resisted such change. And, keeping with examples from present global affairs, with ethnic cleansings happening to Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China and Palestinians in Palestine, Each individual must promptly decide whether they will shun the revolutionary and liberating action of the absurd hero and accept the possibility of finding themselves on the wrong side of history, inevitably becoming subject to Vichy Syndrome. While it would be overzealous to assert that Camus and Sartre provide answers to how we ought to act with regard to these issues, history has shown that we can look to the philosophers for frameworks through which we can view the issues and our relationships to them.
1 “Albert Camus | Biography, Books, Philosophy, Death, & Facts | Britannica,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Albert-Camus.
2 Haley Brown, “French Colonialism in Algeria: War, Legacy, and Memory” (, n.d.), https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1452&context=honors_theses.
3 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (New York: Vintage International, 2018), 23.
4 Camus, Sisyphus, 3.
5 Camus, Sisyphus, 31.
6 Camus, Sisyphus, 41.
7 Camus, Sisyphus, 123.
8 Camus, Sisyphus, 6.
9 “Jean-Paul Sartre | Biography, Ideas, Existentialism, Being and Nothingness, & Facts | Britannica,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Paul-Sartre.
10 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness : A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology.
11 Sartre, Being, 44.
12 Sartre, Being, 58.
13 H. Gaston Hall, “Aspects of the Absurd,” Yale French Studies , no. 25 (1960).
14 Hall, “Absurd.”
15 Hall, “Absurd.”
16 “Existentialism in Modern Art - Modern Art Terms and Concepts,” The Art Story, 2012, https://www.theartstory.org/definition/existentialism/.
17 “Understanding Formal Analysis,” www.getty.edu, n.d., http://www.getty.edu/education/teachers/building_lessons/formal_analysis.html#line.
18 Stanley Hoffmann, “The Effects of World War II on French Society and Politics,” French Historical Studies 2, no. 1 (1961): 28.
19 Camus, Sisyphus, 56-57, 121.
20 Britannica, “Encyclopedia Britannica,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/.
21 Hoffman, “Effects.”
22 Tony Judt, “The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” Daedalus 121, no. 4 (1992): 83–118, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20027138?seq=1.
23 “Black Lives Matter Movement | World News | the Guardian,” the Guardian (The Guardian, May 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/black-lives-matter-movement.
24 “H.R.1280 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021,” Congress.gov, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1280.
25 Congress.gov, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr5/BILLS-117hr5ih.xml.
26 “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang.
27 Hayes Brown, “The Latest Israel-Palestine Crisis Isn’t a ‘Real Estate Dispute.’ It’s Ethnic Cleansing.,” MSNBC.com (MSNBC, May 11, 2021), https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/what-israel-calls-real-estate-dispute-really-ethnic-cleansing-n1266897.
Bibliography
“Albert Camus | Biography, Books, Philosophy, Death, & Facts | Britannica.” In Encyclopædia Britannica, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Albert-Camus.
Bacon, Francis. Man in a Cap. 1945. Oil on Fireboard. Metropolitan Museum of Art.
“Black Lives Matter Movement | World News | the Guardian.” the Guardian. The Guardian, May 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/black-lives-matter-movement.
Britannica. “Encyclopedia Britannica.” In Encyclopædia Britannica, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/.
Brown, Haley. “French Colonialism in Algeria: War, Legacy, and Memory.” , n.d. https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1452&context=honors_theses.
Camus, Albert, and Justin O’brien. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage International, 2018.
“China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang
Congress.gov, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr5/BILLS-117hr5ih.xml.
“Existentialism in Modern Art - Modern Art Terms and Concepts.” The Art Story, 2012. https://www.theartstory.org/definition/existentialism/.
Hall, H. Gaston. “Aspects of the Absurd.” Yale French Studies , no. 25 (1960): 26. https://doi.org/10.2307/2928897.
Hayes Brown. “The Latest Israel-Palestine Crisis Isn’t a ‘Real Estate Dispute.’ It’s Ethnic Cleansing.” MSNBC.com. MSNBC, May 11, 2021. https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/what-israel-calls-real-estate-dispute-really-ethnic-cleansing-n1266897.
Hoffmann, Stanley. “The Effects of World War II on French Society and Politics.” French Historical Studies 2, no. 1 (1961): 28. https://doi.org/10.2307/286182.
“H.R.1280 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021.” Congress.gov, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1280.
“Jean-Paul Sartre | Biography, Ideas, Existentialism, Being and Nothingness, & Facts | Britannica.” In Encyclopædia Britannica, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Paul-Sartre.
Judt, Tony. “The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe.” Daedalus 121, no. 4 (1992): 83–118. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20027138?seq=1
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness : A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. Translated by Hazel Barnes. 1943. Reprint, Washington Square Press, 1992. .
“Understanding Formal Analysis.” www.getty.edu, n.d. http://www.getty.edu/education/teachers/building_lessons/formal_analysis.html#line.